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OUTLINE FOR 
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT ACT 
AND EEOC GUIDELINES ON 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION 
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 
March 27, 1981 
By 
John D. Schmelzer 
I 
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA) 
I. 29 U.S.C. 621-634 - General. 
A. Originally enacted in 1967; amended 1974; amended again 
1978. 
B. Coverage - protects individuals between 40 and 70 years; 
applies to private employers of 20 or more employees _ 
(Title VY:'I-lS) ; 
covers labor organizations and employment agencies 
(same as Title VII); 
covers state and local governments (same as Title VII): 
applies to federal government (coverage 40 to no upper 
limit) . 
c. ADEA's substantive and procedural provisions are simi-
lar but not identical to Title VII. 
II. TIME LIMITATIONS'AND OTHER PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES 
A. CP has 180 days from last act of discrimination to file 
charge with EEOC if no state agency dealing with age 
discrimination. 
B. CP has 300 days to file charge with EEOC if state 
agency or within 30 days after notice by state that 
its age proceeding has concluded whichever is earlier. 
c. CP's failure to file timely charge with state agency 
does not affect feqeral right: hence, as long as CP 
'files charge with EEOC within 300 days (if in state 
prohibiting Age discrimination) CP has complied with 
prerequisite to filing suit. ~ Os~_Mayer v. Evans, 
441 U.S. 750 (1979). 
D. Best protection for CP - attempt to file with EEOC 
within 180 days. 
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E. Issue - When is the last act of discrimination in a 
discharge case? Most courts hold: time runs from notice 
of discharge rather than subsequent attempts (arbitra-
tion or internal procedures) to reverse the discharge. 
F. CP must wait 60 days before filing suit after filing 
a charge. 
I ~ 
Pur~ose - allow period for informal resolution of charge. 
A. General 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
Either party can request jury trial (no juries in 
Title VII because equitable action) . 
No class actions may be brought pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. Rule 23 (unlike Title VII). However, opt in 
collective actions permitted. See LaChapelle v. 
-owe·ns~:IllJJl.6is·, 513 F. 2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) • 
. -
CP cannot intervene in ADEA suit brought by EEOC 
(CP in Title VII has statutory right to intervene _ 
an EEOC suit 1. 
EEOC suit cuts off rights of private CP. 
B. Statutes of Limitations 
1. CP must file suit within three years of discrimi-
natory act for willful violations of ADEA; two years 
for other violations. 
2. Wil1fu11 violation - any violation that is inten-
tional, knowing, or voluntary, as opposed to acci-
dental. Almost all violations are willful. See 
Wehr v. Burrough Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
3. Limitation period may be tolled for EEOC but not for 
private party up to I year while attempting to 
secure employer's voluntary compliance. 
C. Damages 
1. CP can recover."amounts owing" - backpay 
"liquidated damages" - double damages for willful 
violation; non dis.cretionary - hence if viola-
tion is willful CP must get damages liquidated. 
"Other legal or equitable relief (reinstatement). 
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2. Most courts against awarding punitive damages: 
argument for - punitive damages are form of legal 
relief; generally available under a statute unless 
specifically negated. 
argument against - creates windfall to CP since 
they already receive liquidated damages. 
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IV. EEOC E~ORCEMENT ACTIONS 
A. Prior to suit EEOC must attempt to eliminate the dis-
criminatory practice through informal methods of con-
ference, conciliation and persuasion. Statutory re-
quirement - section 7(b). 
B. Elements of Conciliation 
1. inform employer of violation. 
2. necessary measures for compliance. 
3. back wages may be recovered by employees. 
4. EEOC may bring puit. 
s. opportunity for employer to respond. 
V. PROHIBITIONS OF ADEA 
-
A. Employer cannot refuse to hire, or discharge, or dis-
crimination against any individual with·respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment because of age (two exceptions--certain tenured 
professors until 1982 and executives with retirement 
benefits of 27,000 can be involuntarily retired between 
65-70). 
B. Limit, segregate or classify employees ••• denying employ-
ment OI?Po;r:tuni:ty, or· othetw'is-e adversely affecting their 
s-tatus B~cau~e ~f age. 
C. Employer can not reduce the wage rate of employee in 
order to comply with ADEA. 
D. Retaliation provision - can not discriminate against 
individual because they have filed a charge, testified 
or assisted in any investigation, proceeding or litiga-
tion under ADEA. . 
4 
VI. STATUTORY.DEFENSES 
A. Lawful for defendant to discriminate if the differenti-
ation is based on reasonable factors other than age. 
Discharge case - issue is a "factor other than age," 
the -higher salary of an older employee? 
oldtr employee in the same position as a younger em-
ployee will generally earn more because of seniority. 
Hence - is the older employee's higher salary "a factor 
other than age" and therefore a valid criterion justi-
fying the discharge? 
Courts split - depends on facts. 
B. Employer can discharge or otherwise discipline an in-
dividual for good cause. 
Employer may show CP's performance was substandard or 
CP had negative attitude toward job or co-employees. 
Employer may show other employees similarly situated 
were disciplined in same manner. 
C. Age as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) -
defense. 
1. Congress has allowed discrimination based on age 
whenever age is "reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the particular business." 
2. BFOQ can not be based on stereotyping; defendant 
has burden of proving empirical data supporting 
their assumption. Courts construe BFOQ's narrowly. 
3. BFOQ defense accepted most frequently where safety 
issue important. Bus drivers; airline pilots; fire-
men. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 
(7th Cir. 1974). See also EEOC v City of St. Paul, 
23 EPD Par. 31,078 (D. Minn. 1980), where trial 
court concluded that age was not a B~OQ justify-
ing age 65 forced retirement of a district fire 
chief. BFOQ,upheld, however, for line firefighters. 
D. Employer Adherence to a Bona Fide Seniority system or 
any bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement, 
pension or insurance plan which is not a subterfuge to 
evade purpose of ADEA, except no plan may require the 
involuntary retirement of any individual between 40-70. 
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1. This provision indicates Congress' recognition that 
employee benefit plans may cost more for older 
workers than the cost for providing those same 
benefits to younger workers. 
2. Accordingly, Labor and now EEOC guidelines permit 
an employer to provide reduced benefits to older 
iworkers if the reduction can be justified on the 
(basis of cost or reasonable actuarial data. Hence, 
no violat'ion of ADEA, if benefits reduced for older 
workers as long as cost to employer for older workers 
is the same as cost for younger workers, although 
younger workers may be receiving greater benefits. 
Actual data may be computed with respect to an en-
tire benefit package or on a benefit by benefit 
basis. 
3. To reduce benefits for older workers 
a. plan must be bona fide 
b. action taken must observe the terms of plan· 
c. can not be a subterfuge to avoid ADEA 
d. must be based on actuarial data 
4. This provision also applicable to layoff situations; 
a. prior to 1978 Arnendments--if company faced with 
layoff, could force older workers to take.ad-
vantage of early retirement, if action taken 
pursuant to bona fide retirement plan. 
b. if there was no provision for early retirement, 
then the forced retirement was violation of ADEA. 
c. now - this section prohibits forcing older em-
ployees to take advantage of early retirement. 
VII. PROVING AN ADEA VIOLATION 
A. Problem - Plaintiff must prove that defendant made de-
cision because of Cp's age. Difficult to prove this 
through overt acts or employer statements but can be 
done through pres~ptions and inferences. . 
B. Allocation of Proof in' an ADEA case similar to Title VII. 
1. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. vs. Green, 411 u.s. 792 
(1973) (first Supreme Court decision on burdens of 
proof in Title VII case). 
2. 
3. 
1 r 
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Texa~ Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, U.S., 
No. 79-1764 (March 4, 1981) (Supreme Court's most 
recent decision on burden of proof under Title VII) • 
Cova v. Coca-Coca Bottling, 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 
1978) (ADEA discharge case which sets out burdens 
for parties); see also Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 
F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1979). 
! a. Plaintiff must first establish prima facie case 
by showing: 
1) CP within protected group (40-70); 
2) CP met applicable job qualifications; 
3) despite qualifications, CP was discharged; 
4) after discharge, emp10yer sought applications 
from persons with similar qualifications 
NOTE: Employers frequently argue that CP re-
placement must be outside the protected 
c1ass--younger than 40. 
-b. Employer now has burden of production to rebut 
prima facie case by showing: 
1) the discharge was "for good cause" or; 
2) the discharge was "based on reasonable factor 
other than age." 
c. Plaintiff must then establish defendant's ex-
planation is pretext for age discrimination. 
C. Plaintiff's Burden - Demonstrate age influenced the 
adverse employment decision. 
1. Courts split - lenient view--if age considered 
then improper. 
2. More common view - "but for test"--CP must show that 
age was a determining factor--a real reason--for 
defendant's action. The adverse decision would not 
have been made but for CP's age. See Loeb v. Tex-
tron Inc., 600.F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1979). 
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D. Statistical Evidence 
1. Can be used by both plaintiff and defendant to 
support various inferences. 
2. Most commonly used in layoff and reorganization cases: 
, 
a. Compare age composition of workforce before re-
organization to age of workforce after reorgani-
zation. 
b. Average age of discharged employee versus 
average age of retained employees. 
c. The statistics between groups should show large 
discrepancy in age. Mastie v. Great Lakes 
Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
• 
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SEXUAL HARASS~mNT 
I. THE PROBLEM 
A. Most commonly men exploiting their position and power 
ove~women in the workplace so that they can make 
sexva1 advances·or suggestions. Issue is--is this 
ponduct a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964? 
B. Frequency. 
II. EEOC'S GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT - 29 CFR 1604.11 
A. General 
1. EEOC amended its guidelines on sex discrimination 
to include section on Sexual Harassment. 45 Fed. 
Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980). 
2. Guidelines criticized by employer groups during 
comment period. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (April 11, 1980). 
B. Content 
1. Definition of Sexual Harassment -- u~we1comed sexual 
advances, or requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct constitutes sexual 
harassment when: 
a. submission is a condition of employment; 
b. submission or rejection of conduct is basis 
for employment decisions; 
c. conduct has the purpose or effect of unreason-
ably interfering with individual's work perfor-
mance or creating an intimidating, hostile or 
offensive work environment. 
2. When determining sexual harassment, EEOC look~ at 
record as a whole and totality of circumstances., 
Harassment is fact specific and to be determined 
on case by case basis. 
3. Sexual harassment coromi tted by super·vis:o'r- -"empl"oyer 
held strict~y liable regardless of whether employer 
"knew or should have known of harassment. 
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4. Sexual harassment committed by non-supervisory or 
line personnel -- employer held liable only where 
it knew or should have known of sexual harassment. 
Employer can obviate liability by showing it took 
immediate steps to correct problem. 
5. Prevention - most effective means of avoiding 
Jliability. Affirmatively raising subject, express-! ing company disapproval -- penalty for those engaging 
. in sexual harassment, develop appropriate sanctions, 
inform employees how to raise issues. 
C. EEOC's purpose in promulgating guidelines -- codifica-
tion of existing law; prevention. 
III. LEADING DECISIONS ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
Employer held liable for sexual harassment committed 
by supervisor even though: 
1. Employer ,gad policy against sexual harassment; 
2. Employer had internal procedures for bringing 
problem to higher management and plaintiff failed -
to exhaust these remedies. 
B. Bundy v. Jackson, 
Cir. 1981). 
F.2d , 24 FEP 1155 (D.C. 
Employer held liable even though victim of sexual 
harassment suffered no loss of any economic or 
tangible job benefits -- no failure to promote or 
job abolished. 
Burden of proof different in sexua~ harassment case 
--once plaintiff has shown sexual harassment and 
trying to establish backpay for failure to pro-
mote, "plaintiff should enter ritual order of 
proof at advantage over typical Title VII claimant." 
c. Tompkins' v.' PubTic S:e~'vj:'ce,' 568 F .. 2d 1044 C3rd' Cir~ . • 
1977) ; Garber v.' Saxon, 522 F.2d 10:32 (~th Ci.r<t 1977t; 
Barnes v. Co'stle f 561 F.2d 9.73 (D •. Cot. Cir •. 19,771.; All 
ho1d--cause of action under Title VII against an, employer 
,where supervis.pr was guilty, of sexu~~ ha~qssrnent and 
plaintiff suffered 'adverse 'job status Ci.e., ba,d evalua-
tion, failure to promote,' fired, or oth~r ~spects of 
career development!". 
